Abstract. We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified (in terms of definitional complexity) account of varied revision sequences -as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
Introduction.
The purpose of this note is to state some recent results concerning the theory of revision sequences and circular definitions derived from Gupta and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth.
This theory of truth has sometimes been regarded as an alternative approach to the Kripkean theory of fixed points via monotone inductive operators, in that it is also a semantical attempt to describe how a language may contain its own, necessarily partially defined, truth predicate. Indeed there are several accounts of semantical approaches to this problem and that of the Tarskian Liar which broadly speaking split the semantical theories into these two camps (for example, [17] , [16] ).
The tenor of the results here is threefold.
(i) Revision theories of truth are complicated. Revision theories of truth (one should speak of theories as there are a class of theories based upon various technical choices to be made -just as in the Kripkean "theory" there are alternative choices of jump evaluation scheme) are complicated. They result in truth sets (defined below) of complexity at least the level of
concerning what kind of concepts are in general definable in this way, using revision theoretical semantical schemes, and some partial results about the scope of such definitions. We give an explicit approach, mirroring the theory of monotone inductive definitions and the theory of the "next admissible set" (cf. [2] , [15] ) that yields a reasonably complete account. (iii) A rapprochement with Kripke. We propose an approach (realistic variance) to introducing variance into revision sequences that solves many of the puzzles arising in the revision theory of truth of certain intuitively "true" (or stable ...) sets of sentences being poorly classified. In so doing we are able to show that the stable sets arising in such sequences are none other than Kripkean fixed points for the supervaluation jump scheme. We believe that, in fact, one may give a revision theoretic account of truth (incorporating realistic variance) called, somewhat awkwardly, a "generalised algorithmic theory" below, that prima facie is very different from the Kripkean one, but which ultimately yields stable truth sets that are also Kripkean fixed points. The results here are all of a technical nature (although some are of a "soft" variety) and so no proofs will be given. These will appear elsewhere [18] . There is also little discussion of the philosophical issues involved, or proposed. Again we hope to discuss the ramifications of these results elsewhere.
For an introduction to both the Kripkean theory and to revision theories the reader may refer to the accounts of [17] , [16] , or [14] .
Revision Theories of Truth and Definability.
Belnap and Gupta in their book develop a general theory of circular definitions. This arose out of their earlier theory of truth, (cf. [3] , [7] ) which construed the Tarskian Truth Biconditionals as being definitional of truth.
Briefly: Let 
The point is that 
(ii) 
coheres with E g ¢ . The Belnap rule thus places the least possible restriction on the choice at limit stages. The motivation here is to "allow free and full play" of the Tarskian Biconditional definitions (cf. [4] ) and not to artificially make up some limiting rule.
We consider first as a paradigm example that of arithmetic and the structure of natural numbers 
The question arises (in [13] . As a corollary, the proof of this yields a previous result of Burgess [4] , that for the language for arithmetic with a partially defined 7 -predicate the truth set of those sentences stably true in all revision sequences (using the Tarskian Biconditionals to revise the extension of 7 ), (the "categorical truths"), using q s r t © form a complete -/ co-®
7
-definable sets yield the domain of the "next stable set over u ". The notion of "sufficient coding apparatus" or "acceptability" is that of Moschovakis [15] . is the least -model of analysis, and exactly the same class of sets of integers are revision theoretically definable over each structure. In our terms ² Ä ³ is a very large set. One might add the comment that it is the process of revision theoretic definition that constructs these sets: the underlying model plays almost no role. Remark: 3 There are strengthenings of the last theorem where we weaken the acceptability requirement, to allow for structures°over which there is a strongly definable coding scheme. It is unknown whether weakly definable coding schemes suffice. (Weakly acceptable structures suffice for Moschovakis, but we have a quantifier switch here.) Remark: 4 It is easy to ask questions about such truth sets which are independent of the axioms of ZF. Theorem 2.1 shows there is a natural mutual interpretation of the notion of strongly revision theoretically definable over d , in the sense of 2.3 (ii), with that of "¦ ¢ ¤ -definable". The theory of the latter reducibility is known to be independent of ZF (cf. Friedman [6] 
Categoricity.
In [8] a theory is developed of how the notion "categorical in a language" can be treated in a similar fashion to truth. They wish to argue that, by doing so they can fend off the spectre of Strong Liar Paradoxes.
The authors consider an augmented language to that (here) of arithmetic,
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, containing a new predicate symbolå , in addition to7 for truth, to be interpreted as the current hypothesis concerning the categorical sentences (that is: stably true over is stably false in all such, it makes little difference to the analysis here if we concentrate just on those stably true everywhere.
is enlarged to a model
with the displayed predicates being the obvious interpretation. They wish to consider revisions of a hypothesis å , concerning now what will ultimately be the set of categorical sentences, in exactly the same way that revisions were used to create new approximations to truth. One thus takes a hypothesis concerning the categorical sentences, call it å % é è X
, and uses this extension in the expanded model above, and finds the stably true sentences relative to the new model in the new language. One thus keeps the extension ofå fixed as we perform the revision process on extensions of7 until we have the stably true sentences with this language. The latter yields a new set of sentences as a revised hypothesis for 
They remark ( [8] , p.231) that "in a sense the semantics forå is at a higher level than that for7 ." It involves the whole revision process for7 , including the concomitant quantification over all starting hypotheses for7 , being considered as a single successor step in the revision process forå . It is perhaps thus unsurprising that the complexity of the resulting stably categorical set (those sentences that occur on a final segment of every As remarked above, membership questions about sets of integers at this level of complexity are, in general, not absolute between models of set theory. Note the above calculation is based on the original revision theory of [8] ; for fully varied revision theory, the complexity is yet higher, as it will be for the stronger notions of " -categorical", needed to fend off stronger liar paradoxes. We believe that (ii) of the theorem is also true for q r , as well as for these semantical schemes with the Herzberger rule, however using the latter imposes severe constraints, and we leave these matters as open questions. The point to be made here is to make precise (at least in one situation) their remark above and ascertain at which higher level the semantics forå is, in fact, taking place.
Realistically Varied Sequences.
In this section we make some observations. The motivation is that of seeking for a definition of a revision process that does three things:
(i) reduces the mathematical complexity of the fully varied stable truth set;
(ii) yields some representation of the set (of pairs) of stable truth sets in revision sequences, or at least gives some structure to the class of such stability sets; (iii) solves (as far as possible) the problem of simple sets of sentences that are intuitively felt to be of a certain category (always stably true/false/unstable etc. ) but which are ill-classified under the current schemes. That we should aim to reduce the complexity of fully varied sequences and the accompanying truth set to something that is at least í · î -absolute should be a fair desideratum. One observation on (iii), is that it is not necessary to globally quantify over all sequences and ensure that all possible coherent limit rules are used cofinally in every sequence. Just require that simple functions have to be used, as follows.
Idea: we only need to enforce variability in a simple class of limit rules in order for the examples that have been produced in the literature as "ill-classified", to "come out right"; and that realistic variance ensures this. Such an example of ill-classification occurs in [C] to provide a counter-example to a revision theoretic system of Yaqūb's, and this would also come out "right" using our definition below; similarly for the subtler variants of the Gupta Puzzle type etc. (e.g.
[8] 6C.10).
Ý
Hence any example used as an "objection" to this realistically varied revision theory as being classified as sometime undesirably unstable, or whatever, will have to consist of (at least) a non-recursive set ) (partial sets considered as those true or false at a particular stage) defined as
and, using truth and falsehood defined in the partial structure,
. At this level, the results above on the strongly definable sets over a model u being those of the next stable set « apply.
As mentioned above one test of this theory is to see how hard it is to solve the following:
Challenge Problem Find a set of sentences ï that is intuitively of a certain category under some starting hypotheses, but, for example, that is badly classified as "sometimes unstable", according to realistic variance.
6. An algorithmic theory of truth: stable sets as certain Kripkean fixed points. The general thrust of these results is that the machinery of revision theory is complicated. It results in truth sets that are either ¡ x ¢ ¤ or yet more complex. The notion of stable categoricity (even assuming a notion of stable truth that is not based on full variance) is also ¡ £ ¢ Ý . An approach suggested by realistic variance is that if we focus attention on a single revision process starting from a given hypothesis, then we arrive at a supervaluation fixed point. In particular we can regard such a revision theory as being a generalisation of the Kripkean supervaluation fixed point approach. In the Kripkean theory we may focus attention on certain fixed points (the minimal fixed point, certain intrinsic fixed points, notably the maximal one etc.) rather than try and "take an average" over all such processes. We attribute meaning to a "stable Kripkean set" that is, to a fixed point. Similarly we here attribute meaning to each stability set of each suitable revision sequence. Under the Belnap and Gupta approach no particular meaning is assigned to the set of stabilities occurring in any one revision sequence: it is one more set to feed into the averaging process. We here adopt Indeed this latter sentence (with hyperarithmetic replacing recursive), could serve as an alternative defining requirement for realistic variance in what follows. It may be that the formal definition above may be too restrictive for some purposes. The point of stating it in this fashion is to emphasise its non-globalarity. the view that the revision process is seeking information based on our initial hypothesis @ . The information we seek is itself the set of stabilities of our revision process.
We may thus regard each revision process as a process illustrating an approach to solving the problem of the extent of a language's ability to express truth in itself (as one would the Kripkean approach). In that case it would seem entirely reasonable to restrict the limit rule to resources no more complicated than the process has produced so far. In particular we do not wish to import into the process information which is "remote from" our starting hypothesis, or more complicated than what we are doing (this being one of the sources of complexity of the theory of standard revision theory.).
Let us suppose that in the theory of realistic variance ( 
The list of equivalences in the theorem below illustrates an interesting convergence of a variety of ideas and concepts. The identity of the ordinals defined in (i) and (iv) is the relativised result [4] , 14.1, due to Burgess. Of course, from the viewpoint we are adopting it makes no sense to "average out" such truth sets by taking an intersection over all starting hypotheses: we should just arrive back at the same level of complexity: a ¡ ¢ ¤ complete categorical truth set (albeit with now improved classificatory properties for sets of sentences).
Note: One can still work the theory of "circular" definitions using this approach: the point again is that the extension of a definition is calculated anew from each starting hypothesis as to its extension. Again we do not take an intersection over all starting hypotheses. With this approach: . If one wanted one could even construe these as "eventually writable" for some generalised computation over the structure u (much as can be done for ordinary computations over suitable structures -see, for example Hinman's article in [10] .)
In a sense to name this (or the realistically varied theory of the previous section) a "generalisation" of the Kripkean supervaluation theory is a misnomer, since not all ú û ý ü fixed points occur as algorithmically varied stability sets: the class of such stability sets is a proper subset of the class of such fixed points. But we may view algorithmic revision processes as "stretched out" or elongated processes of attempting to reach certain supervaluation fixed points.
If one desired to adopt the Gupta and Belnap tactic for dealing with Strengthened Liar paradoxes in this context, one could also define the notion of stable categoricity here, just as in Section 3, by adding a predicate to the language and finding repeatedly stability sets relative to such a "hypothesis" in this extended notion, and cycle these stability sets as the successive hypotheses.
